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The Effects of Shareholder Primacy, Publicness, 
and “Privateness” on Corporate Cultures 
 
Donald C. Langevoort* 
 
 There is widespread belief in both scholarship and business practice that 
internal corporate cultures materially affect economic outcomes for firms, for better 
or worse.  An often-quoted book on management has argued that “the only thing of 
real importance that [business] leaders do is to create and manage culture.”1  A 
recent academic survey found that 51% of executives sampled consider corporate 
culture to be a top three “value driver” at their companies, and another 27% say it is 
in the top five; a whopping 91% of them say that improving their corporate culture 
would increase their firm’s value.2  This has become an explosive subject of 
academic research as well.  A prominent 2011 literature review just on the 
connections between corporate culture and organizational effectiveness identified 
some 4600 scholarly articles from which to draw,
3
 a number that would be far larger 
today.   
 
*
  Thomas Aquinas Reynolds Professor of Law, Georgetown University Law Center.  Thanks to 
Jennifer Hill, Hillary Sale, and participants at a Vanderbilt law and business workshop for helpful 
suggestions.  This essay addresses many ideas relating to behavior and culture on which there is a 
massive amount of scholarship, but will not offer correspondingly extensive citations.  Footnotes will 
simply highlight some particularly notable examples from the various disciplines at work and their 
uses by legal scholars, with special attention to the amazingly rich contributions from the Berle 
symposia published in the Seattle University Law Review over the last decade. 
1
  EDWARD SCHEIN, ORGANIZATIONAL CULTURE AND LEADERSHIP 11 (4
th
 ed. 2010); see also 
Boris Groysberg et al., The Leader’s Guide to Corporate Culture, 96 Harv. Bus. Rev., no. 1 (Jan.-
Feb. 2018) at 44. 
2
 See John Graham et al., Corporate Culture: Evidence from the Field, available at 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2805602 (2018).   
3
  See Chad Hartnell et al., Organizational Culture and Organizational Effectiveness: A Meta-
Analytic Review, 96 J. App. Psych. 677 (2011).  On the same subject somewhat more recently, see 
Elizabeth A. Martinez et al., Organizational Culture and Performance, 105 Am. Econ. Rev. (Papers 
& Proceedings) 331 (2015). 
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In turn, there is also a growing belief that corporate governance 
arrangements materially affect corporate cultures.  If this is true, it suggests an 
intriguing three-link causal chain: governance choices influence corporate 
performance, at least in part via their effects on internal culture.  This essay 
explores that possibility.  This is important to lawyers and legal scholars because of 
the symbiotic nature of law and governance, with an increasing risk of enhanced 
corporate criminal and civil liability when cultures are judged to be deficient.
4
 
Finding the right place for culture in governance is a heavy lift, deeply rooted in the 
intense academic and political battles about agency theory, shareholder primacy, 
and corporate social responsibility. 
By many accounts today (though hardly without controversy), the dominant 
norm in American corporate governance is shareholder primacy—managers are 
expected as a result of the combined forces of law, culture and economic incentives 
to act intently for the wealth-maximizing benefit of their shareholders.  The 
theoretical justification for this truncated autonomy is that managers are naturally 
self-interested, requiring monitoring of various sorts in the name of (if not by) its 
shareholders in order to minimize opportunism in the exercise of power.  To 
enthusiasts for this principal-agent model of governance, this embrace of the 
shareholder primacy norm in the last three or four decades has paid off in greater 
productivity, innovation and capital formation.  Many in financial economics and 
corporate law thus now take it as a normative given,
5
 arguing only about whether we 
need to empower and protect shareholders a bit more, less, or have it about right to 
 
4
  As discussed infra, the connection between culture and legal compliance programs has become a 
substantial subject of discussion in law and management studies, about which I have written a good 
deal.  See Donald C. Langevoort, Cultures of Compliance, 54 Am. Crim. L. Rev. 933 (2017).  In 
the U.S., assessments of culture matter at least in terms of prosecutorial discretion and punishment, 
and increasingly via positive regulatory mandate.  See pp. --- infra.  Outside the U.S., the legal 
consequences of flawed corporate cultures are increasingly more explicit, if perhaps not all that 
aggressively enforced. See Jennifer G. Hill, Legal Personhood and Liability for Flawed Corporate 
Cultures, Dec. 2018, available at http//ssrn.com/abstract_id=3309697.  
5
 Including an attempt at closure by intellectual fiat.  See Henry Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, 
The End of History for Corporate Law, 89 Geo. L.J. 439 (2001). 
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achieve optimal shareholder wealth over the desired time frame and unit of 
measurement.
6
   
Against all this, many sociologists and some legal scholars argue that the 
coupling of shareholder primacy and shareholder empowerment is toxic, with 
corrosive consequences for society in general and the long-run interests of firms 
themselves.  They worry that corporate leaders have come proudly to self-identify 
as zealous agents for their shareholders, and attack the myths associated with 
principal-agent theory insofar as it normalizes unfettered profit-seeking and gross 
income inequality.
7
  Demanding investors who applaud such managers (and the 
financial markets they drive through active trading in various financial instruments) 
are, in this portrait, sheep-clothed enemies of the public good.  A substantial and 
increasing amount of popular and public discourse about greedy short-termism 
gives voice to this. 
Naturally enough, the sociologists and their acolytes in law view these 
aspects of governance entirely through the lens of culture.  To those steeped in 
neoclassical economics, on the other hand, culture studies are too soft and mushy 
to have anything of use to offer compared to understanding the rational incentives 
that drive managerial and investor behavior.  But that assumption has been 
weakening for some time.
8
  The particular inspiration for my essay came from 
reading a recent series of papers in financial economics purporting to find that 
shareholder empowerment in corporate governance tends, as sociologists fervently 
predict, to degrade previously ethical corporate cultures. A study by Guiso, 
Sapienza and Zingales (GSZ) finds a significant positive correlation for publicly 
traded companies between survey-based indicators of how employees view the 
integrity of senior management and the firm’s financial performance going forward, 
 
6
  So the still inconclusive debates over long- and short-termism, and about market prices as an 
accurate (or at least best available) measure of fundamental value in the long run. 
7
  For an excellent account, see GERALD F. DAVIS, MANAGED BY THE MARKETS: HOW FINANCE 
RESHAPED AMERICA (2009). 
8
  For a review, see Quentin Dupont & Jonathan M. Karpoff, The Trust Triangle: Law, Reputation 
and Culture in Empirical Financial Research, Nov. 2018, available at 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3105693.  
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value not immediately impounded in stock price.
9
  More pointedly, they also find 
that privately owned firms have higher integrity scores on average than otherwise 
comparable public ones with large institutional investor block ownership.  Culture, 
they argue, best explains these results, which implies that reducing shareholder 
empowerment would help restore integrity to corporate cultures.  The authors are 
appropriately cautious about their findings, asking mainly that it provoke an 
intensive research agenda into the economic significance of corporate cultures.  
From a lawyer’s perspective, my essay is in that same spirit. 
My conundrum question is this: suppose managerialism triumphed in the 
governance wars so as to gain its desired level of autonomy from shareholder 
pressures for boards and managers.  Would we then expect to see a cultural shift 
inside corporations toward greater honesty and civil engagement, and if so why?
10
  A 
helpful diagnostic question is to ask how managers currently construe shareholder 
and market primacy.  Have they internalized it as a value, or instead resent the 
demands?  My argument here leans more toward resentment, though my 
contribution is more about how to develop a credible hypothesis than proving it, 
which ultimately is an empirical matter.
11
  My hypothesis here is that corporate 
cultures ordinarily reflect an inward point of view wherein the perceived (and 
maybe mythical) imperatives of organizational survival and success become the 
dominating values, not serving shareholders or anyone else.  It is deeply self-
protective.  If so, more unfettered managerialism in pursuit of better corporate 
 
9
 Luigi Guiso et al., The Value of Corporate Culture, 117 J. Fin. Econ. 60 (2015).  See also, e.g., 
Jillian Popadak Grennan, A Corporate Culture Channel: How Increased Shareholder Governance 
Reduces Firm Value, available at https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2345384 
(2014); Andrew von Nordenflycht, The Public Corporation on Wall Street: Public Ownership and 
Organizational Misconduct in Securities Brokerage, 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1819339 (2017)(higher relative incidence of 
misconduct among public securities firms compared to privately held ones). 
10
 For such a vision, see Lynn Stout, On the Rise of Shareholder Primacy, Signs of its Fall, and the 
Return of Managerialism (in the Closet), 36 Seattle U. L. Rev. 1169 (2013). 
11
  I do agree that segments of the investor community pushed the norm of shareholder primacy, at 
least in part, to enhance their own power and legitimacy.  See Claire A. Hill & Brett McDonnell, 
The Agency Cost Paradigm: The Good, the Bad and the Ugly, 38 Seattle U. L. Rev. 561 (2015). 
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cultures wouldn’t be quite so appealing a solution, and indeed might just produce a 
different form of rent-seeking.
12
 
  This takes us to a second front in the governance wars.
13
  Many legal 
scholars recently (myself included) have written about the increasing demands of 
“publicness” on highly salient firms, especially those that are publicly-traded.14  
These are external, socially-generated pressures in the name of legitimacy, 
transparency, accountability, and outsider voice.  As to these forces, sociologists and 
their legal kin are downright enthusiastic.  After all, if shareholder primacy degrades 
corporate culture, then these pressures should have precisely the opposite effect, 
serving as a channel by which pro-social instincts are infused into them.  This, 
arguably, is what would rush in to freshen the cultural climate once the swamp of 
shareholder primacy is drained.  But for many of the same reasons that I question 
the deep normativity of shareholder primacy, I am skeptical of this inference as 
well.
 15
     
The remainder of this essay explains these doubts, which requires an 
introduction to the economics of corporate culture, a subject not yet well 
appreciated in corporate law.  Accordingly, Part I introduces the battle over 
corporate cultures as part of a broader contestation about primacy in corporate 
governance, offering a perspective on the meaning of corporate culture, its place in 
political debates over corporate responsibility, and its usefulness to corporate law.  
This first part also tries to define with more clarity the differences between the 
cultural norms of shareholder primacy and publicness.  Part II is introductory as 
 
12
  This connects to work in financial economics showing that a shift from public to private status 
(i.e., a private equity transaction) reduces agency costs.  See Jesse Edgerton, Agency Problems in 
Public Firms: Evidence from Corporate Jets in Leveraged Buyouts, 67 J. Fin. 2187 (2012). 
13
 On the complicated nature of the political landscape as between shareholder and stakeholder 
primacy, see Christopher M. Bruner, Center-left Politics and Corporate Governance: What is the 
"Progressive" Agenda?, 2018 BYU L. Rev. 267. 
14
  E.g., Hillary A. Sale, The New “Public” Corporation, 74 Law & Contemp. Probs. 137 (2011); 
Donald C. Langevoort & Robert B. Thompson, “Publicness” in Contemporary Securities 
Regulation After the JOBS Act, 101 Geo. L.J. 337 (2013); Oonig Dombalagian, Principles for 
Publicness, 67 Fla. L. Rev. 549 (2015).   
15
 To be clear, I self-identify as seeking a more public-regarding conception of corporate rights and 
responsibilities, with shareholder power nonetheless playing a legitimate and important subsidiary 
role to check a dangerous excess of managerialism.  Cf. Robert B. Thompson, Anti-Primacy: 
Sharing Power in American Corporations, 71 Bus. Law. 381 (2016). 
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well, turning the reader’s attention to the overwhelmingly diverse scholarly 
perspectives on corporate culture (II-A) and the essential place of corporate culture 
within the overarching canopy of social culture (II-B).  Part III moves on to ask 
about the work being done by corporate culture in terms of both law and 
governance, and the extent to which this can or should be thought of in 
functionalist terms.  Parts IV and V are the main pay-off: an assessment of 
arguments in light of all the foregoing about the cultural causes and effects about 
shareholder primacy, publicness and “privateness.”  Part VI concludes with a closer 
look at the politics surrounding the corporate culture wars. 
 
I.  GOVERNANCE AND CULTURE 
 
 Matters relating to managerial prerogative vis-à-vis shareholder rights have 
constituted a contested intellectual and political battleground for the last fifty years 
at least.  The fundamental questions are by now familiar ones.
16
  Are shareholders 
or a broader set of stakeholders the intended beneficiaries of corporate law, and 
why?
17
  Then, depending on the response to that first question, what mix of rights 
and responsibilities as among managers, directors, shareholders and other 
stakeholders produces the optimal output of the preferred benefit?  Students of 
corporate governance (and readers of the Berle symposia) know that there can be 
endless mixing and matching of possible answers.  Even if shareholder best interest 
is the chosen goal, for instance, one can be in favor of either more managerial 
autonomy or greater shareholder power—this is still probably the biggest divide 
among legal scholars and financial economists.  On the other hand, if one thinks 
that broader public or stakeholder interests deserve primacy, one could still be in 
 
16
 See generally JENNIFER G. HILL & RANDALL S. THOMAS, RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON 
SHAREHOLDER POWER (2015).  This includes battling over using stock market prices as the 
dominating metric for good or bad governance. 
17
  To be sure, most would agree that the economic system and all its institutions exist for society’s 
benefit. Those who push a strong vision of shareholder primacy believe that it creates better 
conditions for maximum efficiency, innovation and optimal social (as well as private) wealth. 
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favor of more managerial autonomy, more shareholder power, or (most 
commonly) enhanced stakeholder or government influence.
18
   
 These arguments are mainly academic, but connect to serious political 
battling that has been going on for many decades now.  The usual historical 
narrative posits that managerialism held sway for a few decades during the middle 
part of the last century, enabling managers to share some of the rents with 
employees, communities and the government (“benevolent managerialism”), 
though perhaps also wasting resources in sinecures and inefficiency.
19
  Exploring 
this was Berle’s project back in the day.  Nearly everyone now agrees that some 
kind of inflection occurred around the late 1970s through the 80s due to a mix of 
inter-related forces,
20
 including in no particular order (1) the growth of institutional 
investors who used their new-found leverage to achieve greater shareholder 
empowerment vis-à-vis management; (2) the rise of independent directors; (3) 
advances in the market for corporate control, and a shift in the law relating to 
control transactions to something (in Delaware, at least) more shareholder-
regarding;
21
 (4) technological change in both production and finance that turned 
corporate attention to new capital marketplace opportunities; (5) an explosion in 
scholarship in business and law that was enthusiastically in support of shareholder 
primacy to counter managerial selfishness (agency costs), the lessons of which 
became central in business schools and law schools; (6) far more stock-based 
compensation for corporate executives; and (7) the stunning growth in the number 
 
18
  In August 2019, the Business Roundtable dramatically “switched sides” in the battling, rejecting 
shareholder primacy and embracing a more public-facing norm.  See Business Roundtable 
Redefines the Purpose of the Corporation to Promote “An Economy that Serves All Americans,” 
https://www.businessroundtable.org/business-roundtable-redefines-the-purpose-of-a-corporation-to-
promote-an-economy-that-serves-all-americans. The message was entirely managerialist: the business 
judgment discretion to take account of public values remains in management alone. 
19
  For a discussion of the behavioral consequences of enhance managerial prerogative, see Marianne 
Bertrand & Sendhil Mullainathan, Enjoying the Quiet Life? Corporate Governance and Managerial 
Preferences, 111 J. Pol. Econ. 1043 (2003). 
20
  See, e.g., Jeffrey N. Gordon, The Rise of Independent Directors in the United States, 1950-2005: 
Of Shareholder Value and Stock Market Prices, 59 Stan. L. Rev. 1465 (2007). 
21
  Although Delaware law had a brief period in the mid-1980s that can so be described, it backed off 
any embrace of hostile control transactions in the Paramount v. Time litigation in 1989.  Nearly all 
other states had already moved to give management more leeway to defeat a bid, no matter how 
lucrative to shareholders.  Of all the forces supposedly pushing in the direction of shareholder 
primacy, law is probably the weakest. 
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of American households who invested in common stock, directly or indirectly, and 
could thus envision themselves as intended beneficiaries.  While these were 
economic shifts, not just cultural ones, it is common to hear claims that the 
inflection brought about a new culture of shareholder primacy with the sole goal of 
shareholder wealth maximization.  Managers became agents, shareholders became 
their principals. 
The political skirmishing in corporate governance that continues on today is 
about the consequences of this inflection, which plays out in the dark shadow of 
what today is immense public unease about economic fairness and opportunity.  
The current generation of battlers sort into different encampments that fight under 
three main banners.
22
  On one side are the staunch managerialists who simply want 
back the autonomy they arguably lost, and preserve what they still have.  They have 
a small cadre of allies in those who may be attracted to either shareholder or 
stakeholder primacy but think that strong managerialism is instrumentally the best 
way to pursue their preferred ends.  Together, they fight against committed 
shareholder primacists who want more rights and greater managerial accountability 
to investors.
23
  We should not over-dramatize: it is not always clear how much value 
really is at stake as to the specific issues being contested here (e.g., staggered boards, 
proxy access, shareholder voice, say on pay); some of the tenacity seems more 
 
22
  Many of those leaning more to the conservative side argue that now that managerial and 
shareholder interests are better aligned via a set of largely non-legal institutions, labor, product and 
financial markets can largely be left alone to generate the optimal incentives needed for wealth 
maximization.  Their opponents say that a greater dose of legally-induced shareholder 
empowerment is still needed to counter a lingering excess of managerial prerogative. Compare 
ROBERTA ROMANO, THE GENIUS OF AMERICAN CORPORATE LAW (1993), with LUCIAN 
BEBCHUK & JESSE FRIED, PAY WITHOUT PERFORMANCE: THE UNFULFILLED PROMISE OF 
EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION (2004). 
23
 To describe all this in war-like terms is hyperbole, of course; governance issues in the U.S. have 
never (at least not yet) gotten enough sustained public attention for that description to fit   In general, 
the managerialists are well organized and so have the upper hand in ordinary times.  See Usha 
Rodrigues, Dictation and Delegation in Securities Regulation, 92 Ind. L.J. 435 (2017).  Scandals, of 
course, have long prompted short-term legislative attention to governance abuses, which are the 
source of much of what we know today as corporate and (especially) federal securities law.  See 
Bruner, supra; Donald C. Langevoort, The Social Construction of Sarbanes-Oxley, 105 Mich. L. 
Rev. 1817 (2007); on how fleeting the effects can be, see John C. Coffee, Jr., The Political Economy 
of Dodd-Frank: Why Financial Reform Tends to be Frustrated and Systemic Risk Perpetuated, 97 
Cornell L. Rev. 1019 (2012). 
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about identity and pride than large territorial gains.
24
 Still, combatants on each side 
work hard to get their way from legislatures, agencies like the SEC, and courts (or at 
least try to block the same by their opponents
25
), exerting pressure on public and 
elite opinion to gain leverage.     
There is a second front in these governance wars.  Those who wanted 
greater corporate social responsibility in the 70s and 80s were seemingly shoved 
aside as the fight between shareholder advocates and managers became the main 
event.
26
  So stakeholder primacists mostly grit their teeth through the 90s.  In 2001-
02, Enron and Worldcom finally gave them their told-you-so moment via what 
seemed to be shareholder wealth maximization run amok.  By this time, the 
counter-narrative had emerged, in sociology in particular, that treated agency cost 
theory and shareholder primacy as destructive myths that became deeply 
internalized as legitimate, yet promoted corporate irresponsibility.  The culture of 
wealth maximization had blinded all of us, they claimed, to what was now lost 
(expectations of benign managerialism in the interest of society as a whole) and the 
escalating risks that could be justified in the name of enhancing equity portfolios, 
including managers’ own bloated ones. Expectations that managers naturally 
pursued selfish goals (the justification for the principal-agent model of corporate 
governance) became dangerously self-fulfilling and normalizing.  The global 
financial crisis a few years later extended that to the problem of systemic risk among 
financial firms, which brought with it much more pain and angst about whether 
 
24
  See Claire A. Hill, An Identity Theory of the Short- and Long- Term Investor Debate, 41 Seattle 
U. L. Rev. 475 (2018). Indeed, there is a good argument to be made that the battling simply creates 
the illusion that managerial power is being moderated, thereby deflecting responsibility and blame. 
See Marcel Kahan & Edward Rock, Symbolic Corporate Governance Politics, 94 B.U. L. Rev. 1997 
(2014).  Or maybe stalemate in the battling is good, a recognition that neither side deserves total 
victory.  E.g., Thompson, supra. 
25
  See, e.g., Business Roundtable v. SEC, 647 F.3d 1144 (D.C. Cir. 2011). 
26
  During the portion of the governance wars of the late 70s and 80s dealing with the market for 
corporate control and hostile corporate takeovers, stakeholders (particularly labor, but also local 
communities) strongly allied with the managerialists and together won many more battles than they 
lost—indeed, to the point where the incidence of hostile takeovers diminished considerably.  But 
they were being used for the most part; as sociologist critics insist, whatever happened to hostile 
takeovers, the trend toward shareholder wealth maximization continued along other paths. 
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society had lost its way in the relentless pursuit of wealth for both shareholders and 
managers.
27
   
Societal unease with this and much more underlies the distinctive demands 
of publicness.  Publicness is a relatively new label in legal scholarship, if not 
necessarily a new idea.  While it can simply refer to the purely regulatory 
consequences that arise when a firm becomes subject to the mandates of the federal 
securities laws, the construct is in fact deeply cultural, describing the consequences 
when influential actors in society expect corporate managers and owners to pay 
attention to public-regarding preferences, and not heedlessly pursue selfish 
corporate objectives.  As applied to corporate governance, this commonly comes in 
the form of insistence on more transparency, openness to others’ voices, and 
accountability for harms that threaten or are felt by persons outside the firm.
28
  
Publicness is legitimacy-based, claiming that the corporation’s right to exercise 
large-scale economic power comes with a quid pro quo (some sociologists pushing 
a similar idea call it “social license”29).  Insofar as it has a normative rather than 
purely descriptive connotation (i.e., that transparency, voice and accountability are 
valuable public goods, not just common memes), it shares space with the 
progressive agendas of corporate social responsibility and sustainability, albeit with 
more emphasis on the process of governance than particular outcomes.   
The idea behind publicness is simple enough.  Corporations that fall short 
of expectations suffer reputationally in many different ways when something serious 
goes wrong.  And the legal consequences that follow will often be harsher because 
of those perceived shortcomings. Thus it behooves boards of directors, in 
 
27
  On the connections between shareholder influence and losses in the crisis, see William Bratton & 
Michael Wachter, The Case Against Shareholder Empowerment, 158 U. Pa. L. Rev. 653 (2010). 
28
  See note – supra. The original use of publicness in legal scholarship came from comparative 
administrative law, with the observation of how the demands of transparency, accountability and 
voice that had become settled with respect to governmental authorities were being directed to 
powerful non-governmental organizations as well.  See Benedict Kingsbury, The Concept of “Law” 
in Global Administrative Law, 20 Eur. J. Int’l L. 23, 31 (2009).  
29
  See Neal Gunningham et al., Social License and Environmental Protection: Why Businesses Go 
Beyond Compliance, 29 L. & Soc. Inquiry 301 (2004).  As used here, publicness is a term of art for 
the amalgam of ways managerial autonomy is challenged by external public demands, beyond 
simple law enforcement.  It has connections to many scholarly constructs in various fields, such as 
reputational capital in economics and the “halo effect” in psychology and economics.   
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particular, to understand and acknowledge the special challenges that come when 
avoiding and dealing with potential scandals that implicate these values.  Law is a 
very big part of publicness, in that sometimes these inchoate demands get worked 
into new legal rules or enforcement of existing rules by regulators and enforcers 
who share, promote, or are otherwise influenced by those societal values.
30
  The 
securities laws are a favored tool for this insofar they address a potent source of 
private privilege and power (large corporations) with a built-in bias for both 
transparency and accountability, and some inviting pathways for voice as well via the 
proxy rules.   
A clear manifestation of publicness is the increasing acknowledgement that 
bolstering a healthy corporate culture is part of officers’ and directors’ business 
judgment responsibilities, driven by noxious compliance (and seemingly cultural) 
disasters that go back to Enron and the financial crisis and extend forward to 
contemporary failures at firms like Wells Fargo, General Motors, Volkswagen and 
the money center banks caught up in the LIBOR-rigging scandal.
31
 The 
Department of Justice and certain regulatory authorities have stressed that evidence 
of an unhealthy corporate culture may matter in terms of how painful a sanction is 
imposed in the event of wrongdoing, or upon whom.
32
  Some federal agencies say 
they actively look for evidence of good or bad culture in their inspections and 
examinations.  There is even more of a buy-in to this in European countries.
33
  The 
Netherlands central bank, for instance, has a team of social scientists (mostly 
 
30
  See Hillary A. Sale, J.P. Morgan: An Anatomy of Corporate Publicness, 79 Brook. L. Rev. 1629 
(2014); see also Jill Fisch, The Mess at Morgan: Risk, Incentives and Shareholder Empowerment, 
83 U. Cinn. L. Rev. 651 (2015). 
31
  See Benjamin van Rooij & Adam Fine, Toxic Corporate Culture: Assessing Organizational 
Processes of Deviancy, 8 Admin. Sciences 22 (2018); Dan Awrey et al., Between Law and Markets: 
Is There a Role for Culture and Ethics in Regulation?, 38 Del. J.Corp. L. 191 (2013).  For recent 
discussions on how to regulate with a view toward better cultures, see Linda Klebe Trevino et al., 
Regulating for Ethical Culture, 3 Behav. Sci. & Pol’y, no. 2, at 57 (2017) and Hui Chen & Eugene 
Soltes, Why Compliance Programs Fail and How to Fix Them, Harv. Bus. Rev., March-April 2018, 
at 117.  Both articles point to the pressing need to develop better metrics by which the quality of 
corporate cultures and climates can be assessed. 
32
 I have explored the idea of and challenges associated with a “culture of compliance” in depth 
elsewhere, see Langevoort, Cultures, supra, and so will not address the cultural dimension of 
compliance programs to any great extent here. 
33
  See Jennifer Hill, supra. 
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psychologists) trained to spot dysfunctional behaviors and cultures, who can 
recommend leadership changes as a corrective if needed.
34
    
Corporate culture has thus become part of the governance wars on both 
fronts.
35
  Anti-managerialists accuse their opponents in the executive suite of 
enabling cultures of greed and arrogance that lead to the corporate scandals we read 
about with all too much frequency.  The managerialists return fire with charges, 
arguably supported by research like GSZ, of rampant cultural degradation by selfish 
investors who force managers to obsess over short-term results.
36
  These cross-
claims imply something (accurately or not) about group-level character and 
disposition, which in turn affects attributions of responsibility and blame when good 
or bad things happen.  They help portray organizational actors as good guys or bad 
guys, perceptions that become usable ammunition in the political and legal 
skirmishing. 
Before moving on to examine governance and culture in more detail, note 
something interesting about the two separate factions against which the 
managerialists seem to be fighting.  In principle (and in fact) those favoring more of 
a public-facing role for large corporations along the second front should be very 
wary of those who fight on the other front for more shareholder influence. But the 
politics of corporate governance are complicated. Shareholder and stakeholder 
 
34
 See John M. Conley et al., Can Soft Regulation Prevent Financial Crises?: The Dutch Central 
Bank Supervision of Behavior and Culture (Nov. 2018), available at 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3277678; DE NEDERLANDSCHE BANK, 
SUPERVISION OF BEHAVIOR AND CULTURE: FOUNDATIONS, PRACTICE AND FUTURE 
DEVELOPMENTS (2015).   
35
  This is particularly at the federal level, with efforts to limit the SEC’s disclosure authority to 
matters of financial materiality and the goals of securities regulation to investor protection and 
(especially) capital formation.  See DONALD C. LANGEVOORT, SELLING HOPE, SELLING RISK: 
CORPORATIONS, WALL STREET AND THE DILEMMAS OF INVESTOR PROTECTION 108, 164-66 
(2016).  As Mark Roe points out, there is something of a bargain among managers, investors and the 
state of Delaware to minimize stakeholder pressures on otherwise efficient governance 
arrangements.  See Mark Roe, Delaware’s Politics, 118 Harv. L. Rev. 2491 (2005). 
36
  As past Berle symposia contributions have amply shown, many commentators claim that 
shareholder primacy and empowerment are the enemy of the common good and thus could be 
expected to join in the celebration of empirical evidence that associates it with a higher incidence of 
bad corporate behavior.  As discussed infra, this was the point championed by the late Lynn Stout, 
both in individual work and joint efforts with Margaret Blair. See Stout, supra; see also Margaret 
Blair & Lynn Stout, Trust, Trustworthiness, and the Behavioral Foundations of Corporate Law, 149 
U. Pa. L. Rev. 1735 (2001); Margaret Blair, Boards of Directors as Mediating Hierarchs, 38 Seattle 
U. L. Rev. 297 (2015). 
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advocates have a common foe in the managerialists, and the managerialists have 
considerable political clout.  They thus have to fight as allies to avoid a beating, 
fundamental philosophical differences notwithstanding. As a result, the biggest 
investors often appear as leading advocates for public-regarding values, and 
progressives often support greater shareholder rights.
37
  Institutional investors like 
Blackrock (and even more so public pension fund investors
38
) play the publicness 
game quite openly.
39
 As such, shareholder and stakeholder interests can easily get 
lumped together as kindred challenges to managerial autonomy.  And so, any 
evidence that somehow associates increased shareholder rights with bad culture, 
fairly or not, can be appropriated by politically savvy managerialists to claim that 
more autonomy on the whole—including freedom from publicness in all its 
manifestations—would bring about healthier corporate cultures and better outcomes 
for all. This connects to Mark Roe’s recent conjecture that the contemporary 
crusade against short-termism allows executives to deflect responsibility for the 
economic dislocation palpably felt by the public: “We’re not the problem . . . . It’s 
the short-term traders and the activist shareholders that prevent us from being the 
good guys we’d really otherwise be.  Our hands are tied.”40    
 
II. IN SEARCH OF CORPORATE CULTURE 
 
 A.  Interdisciplinarity 
 
 
37
  See Bruner, supra, describing how many forces lead to this complicate political map, which 
among other things produce a “left-center” embrace of shareholder rights in federal securities law, 
but an inconsistent-seeming skepticism of shareholder primacy as to matters of the state corporate 
law. 
38
 See DAVID WEBBER, THE RISE OF THE WORKING CLASS SHAREHOLDER: LABOR’S BEST 
WEAPON (2018). 
39
 In the right circumstances, institutional shareholder pressure—and its influence on stock prices—
can be important pathways through which publicness norms spread.  Chitru S. Fernando et al., 
Corporate Environmental Policy and Shareholder Value: Following the Smart Money, 52 J. Fin. & 
Quant. Analysis 2023 (2017). 
40
  Mark J. Roe, Stock Market Short-termism’s Impact, 167 U. Pa. L. Rev. 71, 116 (2018). 
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 To be clear up front, my aim here is not to assess the consequences for the 
firm of either shareholder power or publicness, but rather ask what role culture 
plays in that process—what is going on in the collective mindset inside the firm.  
Many scholars, including occasional contributors to prior Berle symposia, have 
made the more direct argument, for example, that greater shareholder power leads 
to certain outcomes (e.g., short-termism), without resorting to cultural explanations 
or invoking soft concepts like social construction or legitimacy.  Perhaps that is best, 
in the name of parsimony.  If incentives and revealed preferences tell a convincing 
enough story as a matter of theory or empirical observation, why bother with 
culture?  I have some answers, but they will have to wait.  The remainder of this 
still-introductory section simply takes inventory of the interdisciplinary tools 
available to study corporate culture once we choose to pay attention to it.
41
  Readers 
already familiar with all this can skip forward. 
While there are many definitions of culture in organizational studies, we can 
think of culture as an internal “system of shared values defining what is important, 
and norms defining appropriate attitudes and behaviors.”42  Or more simply, 
perhaps, “how we do things around here.”43  This is capacious, to be sure.  At its 
core, corporate culture deals with taken-for-granted values about good and bad, 
right and wrong, legitimate and illegitimate, in the way the firm conducts its 
business.  Culture extends as well into the more mundane, including styles of 
speech, appropriate appearance and the like.  These are less important but not 
inconsequential; expected shirt colors or style of dress might have little meaning in 
any deep sense, for example, but send a message indirectly about authority and 
conformity.   
 This is where assessing the cultural causes and effects of something like 
shareholder primacy gets hard.  First, the general assumption in the literature is that 
 
41
 Legal scholars have drawn from this work for some time, often using it to mount critical attacks on 
the conservative, laissez faire attitudes in corporate law that fail to restrain anti-social corporate 
norms.  An early legal classic is CHRISTOPHER D. STONE, WHERE THE LAW ENDS: THE SOCIAL 
CONTROL OF CORPORATE BEHAVIOR (1975). 
42
 Charles A. O’Reilly & Jennifer A. Chatman, Culture as Social Control: Corporations, Cults and 
Commitment, 18 Res. Org. Behav. 157, 166 (1996). 
43
  Trevino et al., supra, at 60. 
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neither owners nor senior management teams can determine the culture (though 
they surely have a “tone at the top” role in it).  We are looking for powerful norms 
that influence a large portion of managers and others who get work done.  And we 
are looking for beliefs and values that are embraced.  Strong shareholder pressure 
surely has incentive effects: if a small set of large institutional investors can demand 
the replacement of the CEO, or ramp up compensation incentives to align 
managerial preferences with those of transient shareholders, that power will be felt 
inside the firm.  But there is no reason to assume that norms will shift to legitimize 
that power—to the contrary, the consequences might be resentment and reactance 
from the managers whose autonomy lessens.  Indeed, that is the claim I’m making 
here.   
 Especially to applied practitioners in law and business, there is a desire for 
more than this kind of theory or abstraction in invoking culture—they want the 
ability to assess, if not actually feel, culture in operation, to understand its content 
and the routes by which its forces travel. So where to look for useful insights?
44
  
This is where sociologists and cultural anthropologists claim their authority.  Such 
deep dives, they say, are precisely what their field is good at.
45
  Researchers do 
sustained ethnographic studies inside individual companies, spending time on the 
inside to hear their descriptions and stories and identify the myths, routines, 
ceremonies, and totems that collectively come to define what is legitimate and 
valued, or treated with scorn or disgust.  Less intrusive techniques are available as 
well: structured interviews and surveys to elicit impressions from a wider range of 
 
44
  An excellent recent review along these lines is Jennifer A. Chatman & Charles A. O’Reilly, 
Paradigm Lost: Reinvigorating the Study of Organizational Culture, 38 Res. Org. Behav. 199 (2016). 
45
  For a thought-provoking call for more use of enthnography in corporate governance and law, see 
Gwendolyn Gordon, Culture in Corporate Law or: A Black Corporation, a Christian Corporation 
and a Maori Corporation Walk into a Bar . . . ., 39 Seattle U. L. Rev. 353, 357 (2016).  For notable 
examples, see ROBERT JACKALL, MORAL MAZES: THE WORLD OF CORPORATE MANAGERS 
(1983); WILLIAM O’BARR & JOHN M. CONLEY, FORTUNE AND FOLLY: THE WEALTH AND POWER 
OF INSTITUTIONAL INVESTORS (1992); KAREN HO, LIQUIDATED: AN ETHNOGRAPHY OF WALL 
STREET (2009); John M. Conley & William O’Barr, Crime and Custom in Corporate Society: A 
Cultural Perspective on Corporate Misconduct, 60 Law & Contemp. Probs. 5 (1997).  More 
generally, see Greg Urban & Kyung-Nan Koh, Ethnographic Research on Modern Business 
Corporations, 42 Ann. Rev. Anthrop. 139 (2013); DAVID A. WESTBROOK, NAVIGATORS OF THE 
CONTEMPORARY: WHY ETHNOGRAPHY MATTERS (2008).   
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persons in a firm or industry, which can be pieced together into coherent accounts 
of both commonalities and differences in expressed beliefs.   
  Large organizations operate on a scale that is hard for any research team to 
observe in real time, however, which necessarily means that it will be studying just a 
slice of the enterprise, and only for a particular time.  Moreover, it can be difficult 
to gain access to the most sensitive personnel within an organization, or know that 
they are being candid rather than reciting from internalized scripts.  Methodological 
skeptics claim that in light of these challenges, the interpretation of cultural 
becomes more art than science, easily enabling the researchers’ own prior 
assumptions and biases to take hold.  First-rate ethnographic work in the corporate 
area exists notwithstanding these challenges,
46
 though the most influential 
contemporary research in the sociology of corporate behavior appears to be more a 
mix of theory (e.g., field theory, social constructionism) and data analysis, very 
much resembling what GSZ do.
47
   
 While the field of organizational behavior might have been formed under 
the influence of sociology, today it draws just as much from research in psychology, 
particularly social cognition.  Here, the individual brain becomes the main focus of 
inquiry into judgment and decision-making inside business organizations.
48
  The 
main tools for understanding perception and choice are laboratory experiments.  
Of particular relevance to thinking about legal compliance is the burgeoning sub-
discipline of behavioral ethics—judgment and decision-making in choices about 
 
46
  See Marina Welker, Notes on the Difficulty of Studying the Corporation, 39 Seattle U. L. Rev. 
237 (2016); Gordon, supra. 
47
 See Neil Fligstein, A Theory of Fields and Its Application to Corporate Governance, 39 Seattle U. 
L. Rev. 237 (2016); Jiwook Jung & Frank Dobbin, Agency Theory as Prophecy: How Boards, 
Analysts and Fund Managers Perform their Roles, 39 Seattle U. L. Rev. 291 (2016). 
48
  An excellent discussion of the divide between sociology and psychology in organizational 
behavior, with a welcome stress on ways it might be bridged, is Barry M. Staw & Robert I. Sutton, 
Macro Organizational Psychology, in J. KEITH MURNIGHAN, ED., SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY IN 
ORGANIZATIONS 350 (1993).  More recently, with a focus on culture and other forces at work in 
determining responses to legal demands, see Ruthanne Huising & Susan Silbey, From Nudge to 
Culture and Back Again: Coalface Governance in the Regulated Organization, 14 Ann. Rev. L. & 
Soc. Sci. 91, 105-07 (2018). 
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right and wrong, including obedience to law.
49
  There are massive numbers of 
interesting studies, which in turn are described in a number of very accessible 
books and extensive literature reviews of behavioral ethics by prominent 
psychologists and management scholars.
50
  Legal scholars have drawn extensively 
from social cognition and the study of managerial traits to shed light on numerous 
issues of corporate governance and compliance.
51
   
 There are severe methodological challenges here, too, including worries 
that some dramatic laboratory results cannot be replicated or otherwise fail to show 
what they purport to show.  Even if sound in experimental design, they may fail to 
capture the social richness and incentive structures found in complex organizations.  
The individual is the focus of study, or at best small group behaviors.  This 
methodological individualism means that culture is thereby diminished in 
importance, to the chagrin of the sociologists.
52
  There is also the lingering concern 
that decision-making in business settings is by people who have been selected for 
and survived the rigors of competition, and thus not representative of the more 
random sampling that generates subjects for psychology experiments.   
 So culture remains slippery to grab hold of, leading to some inevitable 
methodological accommodations to gain traction.  Some psychologists working on 
organizational behavior, for example, simply assume from common sense or 
anecdotal observation that the same heuristics and biases found in individual 
judgment will naturally be replicated in corporate cultures, perhaps even 
amplified.
53
  (This is one place where there can be some common ground between 
the sociologists and the psychologists, to the extent that the former’s ethnographic 
 
49
  For a recent overview, see YUVAL FELDMAN, THE LAW OF GOOD PEOPLE: CHALLENGING 
STATES’ ABILITY TO REGULATE HUMAN BEHAVIOR (2018); see also Langevoort, SELLING HOPE, 
supra, at 28.   
50
 See Trevino et al., supra; see also Linda Klebe Trevino et al., (Un)ethical Behavior in 
Organizations, 65 Ann. Rev. Psych. 635 (2014); Nicholas Epley & David Tannenbaum, Treating 
Ethics as a Design Problem, 3 Behavioral Sci. & Pol’y, no. 2, at 73 (2017); EUGENE SOLTES, WHY 
THEY DO IT: INSIDE THE MIND OF THE WHITE COLLAR CRIMINAL 135-37 (2016). 
51
  Myself included.  See Langevoort, Cultures of Compliance, supra, at 950-51. 
52
 See, e.g., Susan Silbey, Taming Prometheus: Talk about Safety and Culture, 35 Ann. Rev. Soc. 
341 (2009). 
53
  E.g., Norbert Kerr et al., Bias in Judgment: Comparing Individuals and Groups, 103 Psych. Rev. 
687 (1996). 
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tools reveal patterns of beliefs and behaviors that seem to echo the latter’s 
experimental predictions.)  That is, if people generally work hard cognitively to 
maintain—accurately or not—a self-conception as good, law-abiding citizens, we 
would expect to find the same work being done for the firm by its internal culture. 
 Other empirical work in organizational behavior tries to get at culture 
indirectly.  “Upper echelon” research focuses on the impact of firm leaders on 
corporate behaviors, following up on a long-standing debate between those who 
think leadership drives both culture and choice and those who deem leaders to be 
largely of symbolic or ceremonial significance.  A series of studies looks at 
individual attributes displayed by leaders to see if individual differences help predict 
actions at the level of the firm (i.e., not simply the leaders’ own choices).  Such 
correlations are attributed to culture, as the most plausible pathway by which 
leaders influence their organizations on a large scale. Numerous researchers seek 
proof in one direction or the other; one recent study confidently found a clear link 
running from individual CEO personality characteristics relating to adaptability and 
attention to detail to the prevailing culture, for example, and then from culture to 
objective measures of financial performance.
54
   
 That sounds a lot like financial economics.  Economists arrived late to 
culture studies; in neoclassical economic models, as noted earlier, culture was 
thought to offer little of use given the commitment to rational expectations and 
revealed preferences.
55
  But for the last few decades, more and more economists, 
too, have come to accept that there are powerful connections between culture of 
various sorts and economic outcomes.
56
 They see corporate cultures as a potentially 
efficient means of coordinating complex activity and, perhaps, countering both 
 
54
  See, e.g., Charles O’Reilly et al., The Promise and Problems of Organizational Culture: CEO 
Personality, Culture and Firm Performance, 39 Group & Org. Mgt. 1 (2014). 
55
  See Luigi Zingales, The “Cultural Revolution” in Finance, 117 J. Fin. Econ. 1 (2015). 
56
  Earlier work by GSZ focused on general cultural forces and their impact on economic behavior.  
Luigi Guiso et al., Does Culture Affect Economic Outcomes?, 20 J. Econ. Perspectives 23 (2006).  
They connect general culture and corporate culture in Luigi Guiso et al., Corporate Culture, 
Societal Culture and Institutions, 105 Am. Econ. Rev. (Papers & Proceedings) 336 (2015). 
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agency costs and free rider problems.
57
  Not surprisingly, the other social sciences 
have been skeptical of the efficiency-based economic approach as grossly 
oversimplified at best.  But as so often is the case when disciplines compete, plenty 
of inter-marrying happens, arbitraging discoveries in one field into model building 
in another (e.g. the growth of behavioral economics and economic sociology).   
Unlike sociologists and cultural anthropologists, economists are dedicated 
functionalists, with efficiency as the prime criterion, and more likely to make 
inferences about culture from observable inputs and outputs than subjective 
assessment.  As data sources become bigger and more manipulable, these 
observations become more intriguing.  A good example is a study showing that 
firms with CEOs who benefit from a suspicious, and possible illegal activity (options 
backdating) are more likely to engage in unrelated misbehaviors as well, signaling an 
unethical culture.
58
 
This kind of empirical work arguably offers solid promise for connecting 
insights from economics, sociology and psychology on corporate cultures.  There 
are other cross-disciplinary approaches as well.  Behavioral ethics—a sub-discipline 
connected to social psychology and behavioral economics—has particularly 
interesting insights that support some of the predictions of conventional economics, 
for example.
59
  Advances in cognitive neuroscience—the newest wave of behavioral 
research
60—show some early promise as well in assessing the impact of culture on 
group beliefs and social behaviors.
61
   
 
57
 E.g., David Kreps, Corporate Culture and Economic Theory, in KIM SHEPSLE, ED., 
PERSPECTIVES ON POSITIVE POLITICAL ECONOMY 93 (1990)(coordination); Ernst Fehr, Behavioral 
Foundations of Corporate Culture, UBS Center Public Paper No. 7, available at 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3283728 (2019)(diminishing free-riding 
through cooperative norms).  For my commentary, see Donald C. Langevoort, Opening the Black 
Box of Corporate Culture in Law and Economics, 162 J. Inst. & Theoretical Econ. 80 (2006). 
58
 Lee Biggerstaff et al., Suspect CEOs, Unethical Culture and Corporate Misbehavior, 117 J. Fin. 
Econ. 98 (2015).  See also Robert Davidson et al., Executives’ Off the Job Behavior, Corporate 
Culture and Financial Reporting Risk, 117 J. Fin. Econ. 5 (2015).  
59
  For a thorough discussion, see Eyal Zamir, Reinforcing Law and Economics: Behavioral Support 
for the Predictions of Standard Economic Analysis, May 2018, available at 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3165904.    
60
 See generally Carlos Alos-Ferrer, A Review Essay on Social Neuroscience: Can Research on the 
Social Brain and Economics Inform Each Other?, 56 J. Econ. Lit. 234 (2018); Owen Jones, Brain 
Perspectives on Investor Behavior and Decision-Making Errors, 41 Seattle U. L. Rev. 349 (2018).  
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All these different ways of getting at corporate culture produce a useful 
ecological diversity.  But purists in each discipline too often seem not to read each 
other, much less collaborate, and we’ve noted some of the mutual mistrust directed 
at the respective methodologies.  Sociologists and anthropologists draw a fairly hard 
line to push back against causal accounts and lessons that focus on individual-level 
behaviors and interventions rather than social forces.
62
  Famously, they treat the 
standards and metrics economists use (market efficiency and principal-agency 
conflicts, in particular) as the products of social construction manifesting themselves 
in observable behaviors only because they are believed to be true—Robert Merton’s 
idea of the self-fulfilling prophecy, played out in markets.
63
  That, in turn, makes 
conventional economists’ collective heads explode.  Here is where the governance 
and culture battle lines form. 
  
 B.  Corporate Cultures inside Social Culture 
 
Many law-oriented discussions of corporate culture seem to assume that 
shared values and beliefs are entirely firm-specific, so that all the interesting and 
important instigators of cultural differences are at work inside the boundaries of a 
given firm.  That can be true almost by definition—corporate cultures are the belief 
systems that operate with respect to the firm and its activities, and are thus 
necessarily internal to it.  But that focus misses something very important. 
 
For a useful introduction, see generally ROBERT M. SOPOLSKY, BEHAVE: THE BIOLOGY OF 
HUMANS AT THEIR BEST AND WORST (2017). 
61
 An interesting commentary on the role of “groupishness” in organizational ethical behavior points 
to the role of oxytocin in the human brain, for example, noting that “[a]ll of these consequences of 
the release of oxytocin serve a group-related purpose—namely, they serve to bind individuals to 
highly cooperative higher-level units, often in the service of outcompeting other groups.  Jesse 
Kluver et al., Behavioral Ethics for Homo Economicus, Homo Heuristicus and Homo Duplex, 123 
Org. Behavior & Human Dec. Processes 150, 154 (2014). 
62
  See Silbey, supra. 
63
  E.g., Jung & Dobbin, supra.  For a somewhat less critical view, see Ezra Zuckerman, Market 
Efficiency: A Sociological Perspective, in Karin Knorr Cetina & Alex Preda, eds., THE OXFORD 
HANDBOOK ON THE SOCIOLOGY OF FINANCE 223 (2012). 
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 As anthropologist Greg Urban stressed in an essay for an earlier Berle 
symposium, firm boundaries are actually very porous when it comes to external 
cultural influences.
64
  From CEOs on down, employees bring multiple aspects of 
the broader “outside” social and economic culture to work with them each day.  
Urban notes that this is essential to business success. Acute awareness of 
marketplace opportunities, risks and trends requires being in synch with these 
broader social forces and their normative content.  Individual corporate cultures 
(and industry cultures, etc.) are better seen as subcultures in motion within this 
complicated societal fabric, not discrete or insular phenomena.   Indeed, as we shall 
see, the dominant sociological account of the corporate culture treats it as part of 
the much larger fabric of social culture, of which any given corporate culture is but 
a part.
65
   
 Many important legal scholars have drawn useful insights for how corporate 
law operates (or should operate) from the assumption that general social norms 
strongly influence corporate behavior.  Jack Coffee once suggested that the 
likelihood of minority shareholder abuse probably correlates fairly closely with 
perceived level of social cohesion, suggesting a top-down effect of general norms of 
law-abidingness translating into norms of corporate behavior.
66
 Ed Rock famously 
developed a shaming theory of how Delaware case law works, often subjecting 
defendants to meaningful public criticism even while absolving them from actual 
liability.
67
  The lively scholarship of corporate “publicness,” with which we began, 
stresses the behavioral demands that come from social expectations about the terms 
and conditions that go with the exercise of corporate power.
68
  In financial 
economics, there are many scholars exploring the causal links between various 
 
64
  Greg Urban, Corporations in the Flow of Culture, 39 Seattle U. L. Rev. 321 (2016); see also Greg 
Urban, Corporate Compliance as a Problem of Cultural Motion, 69 Rutgers U. L. Rev. 435 (2017). 
65
  This is a main point in the survey by Dupont & Karpoff, supra. 
66
  See John C. Coffee Jr., Do Norms Matter? A Cross-Country Evaluation, 149 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1251 
(2001). 
67
 Edward Rock, Saints and Sinners: How Does Delaware Corporate Law Work?, 44 UCLA L. Rev. 
1009, 1047 (1997).   
68
  For other law-oriented discussions of corporations and cultural norms, see, e.g., Mark J. Roe, Can 
Culture Constrain the Economic Model of Corporate Law?, 69 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1255 (2002); 
Edward Rock & Michael Wachter, Islands of Conscious Power: Law, Norms and the Self-
Governing Corporation, 149 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1619 (2001). 
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manifestations of general cultural belief (e.g., religiosity
69
 and politics
70
) and 
corporate financial decisions or performance.  These studies suggest that firms 
whose principal office is located in a geographic area with distinctively liberal or 
conservative views, for instance, make different business and financial decisions 
from peer firms in different locales.  GSZ make a brief reference to the fact that a 
disproportionate number of high integrity firms in their sample were from the 
southern part of the U.S.
71
  
 To the extent that these external social norms are healthy ones, this is a 
good thing.  If social norms strongly tend toward trustworthiness, cooperation, and 
law-abidingness, the corporate culture has less work to do in eliciting the same 
behaviors inside the firm.
72
  There will be little or no role conflict; employees will be 
happier and more productive.  The late Lynn Stout was a forceful advocate for 
getting rid of the detritus of shareholder primacy so that directors can follow their 
natural pro-social instincts rather than be made slaves to the production of quarterly 
earnings growth and high stock prices.
73
  This seems to be the GSZ inference, too. 
 But there are two worries.  One is that broader social norms may not 
necessarily be healthy; we can all readily think of aspects of our prevailing culture 
that corporations might want to select against rather than for in seeking managerial 
talent: disrespect for authority, conspicuous consumption, excessive individualism 
and self-centeredness.
74
  (Worse, there are some countries and regions where the 
 
69
 Giles Hilary & Kai Hui, Does Religion Matter in Corporate Decision Making in America?, 93 J. 
Fin. Econ. 455 (2009); Sean McGuire et al., The Impact of Religion on Financial Reporting 
Irregularities, 87 Acct’g Rev. 645 (2012); Muffada Baxamusa & Abu Jalal, CEO’s Religious 
Affiliation and Managerial Conservatism, 45 Fin. Mgt. 67 (2016). 
70
  See Ahmed Elnahas et al., CEO Political Ideology and Mergers and Acquisitions Decisions, 45 J. 
Corp. Fin. 162 (2017); Irena Hutton et al., Political Values, Culture and Corporate Litigation, 61 
Mgt. Sci. 2905 (2015). 
71
  GSZ at 73. 
72
  Id.  For example, there will be more trust of corporate disclosures in countries where the culture 
is more trusting generally.  See Mikhail Pevzner et al., When Firms Talk, Do Investors Listen?  The 
Role of Trust in Stock Market Reactions to Corporate Earnings Announcements, 117 J. Fin. Econ. 
190 (2015).   
73
 LYNN STOUT, CULTIVATING CONSCIENCE: HOW GOOD LAW MAKES GOOD PEOPLE 94-118 
(2011). 
74
 A particularly pertinent example is that one firm’s fraud increases the likelihood of fraud on the 
part of other companies located in the same urban area, even though they are in different lines of 
business and do not compete.  In other words, being proximate to yet-undetected misbehavior is a 
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prevailing culture goes so far as to normalize individual corruption.
75
)  For instance, 
a securities firm might consciously try to de-emphasize sales pressure in customer 
interactions via ethics training, only to run up against resistance from financial 
advisers who interact frequently in their home locales with peers in other firms who 
continue to associate inflated sales with status and success.  The corporate culture 
will have to push back against these unwanted norms.   
The other, and potentially more insidious, is that these healthy social norms 
come to be seen as inconsistent with the perceived “what it takes” to succeed.  The 
firm may want hyper-motivation, risk-taking, and competitive arousal in doses well 
beyond what ordinary candidates display.  It will select for the extraordinary 
candidates along these dimensions, of course, but may also have to attract others 
and acculturate them into the desired mindset.  If so, corporate culture is now 
doing a very different kind of work.  We shall play out this story in the next 
sections, because it has much to say about the manageability of corporate culture, 
for both good and bad.  The idea that boards and executives cannot possibly have 
meaningful control over all the external cultural forces at work inside the 
organization injects a useful cautionary note in discussions about the legal 
responsibility to manage culture. There are cult-like organizations that seek to 
radically re-acculturate people into a mindset that erases normative outside 
influences, but few competitive businesses could afford to do so or, as Urban points 
out, truly want to.   
 Neither can we assume that the corporate culture operates uniformly or 
effectively within the entire expanse of those boundaries.  Localized subcultures can 
emerge at odds with what is believed or valued elsewhere in the firm, and there will 
be individual defectors (perhaps many) who don’t get, and may actively resist, the 
preferred messages.  A study of the “Nut Island” effect tells the story of an award-
 
motivator to cheat, too.  See Christopher Parsons et al., The Geography of Financial Misconduct, 73 
J. Fin. 2087 (2018). 
75
 See Xiaoding Liu, Corruption Culture and Corporate Misconduct, 122 J. Fin. Econ. 307 (2016).  
Amir Licht has done important work connection national culture to many aspects of corporate 
governance and behavior.  E.g., Amir N. Licht, Culture and Law in Corporate Governance, in 
Jeffrey Gordon & George Ringe, eds., OXFORD HANDBOOK ON CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AND 
LAW (2018). 
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winning unit of the Boston Harbor waste disposal authority that came to resist 
oversight from what it regarded as illegitimate supervision, turning that aim into 
such a potent belief that it ultimately put raw sewage into the harbor rather than 
acknowledge the need for help from above.
76
  We will come back to this in 
exploring how culture is transmitted inside organizations.  
 It is also worth stressing the connection between peer cultures and the 
boundaries of the firm.  In sociology and financial economics, researchers have 
demonstrated the ease by which both information and ideas travel from firm to 
firm via network linkages
77
 and governance overlaps (e.g., directors who serve on 
multiple boards, law firms that serve multiple clients, etc.)  Innovations in 
governance tools like poison pills for fighting off would be acquirers
78
 or options 
backdating to make employee stock options more lucrative to the grantees,
79
 for 
example, have been shown to travel both of those pathways to determine who 
would be early adopters and who would be late or not adopt at all. 
 These diverse perspectives suggest that it is overly simple to frame questions 
about corporate cultures in terms of, say, the influence of the CEO on the 
organization’s culture.  And even if that is the focus, what drives the CEO’s 
perceptions and beliefs?  A CEO who runs in social or political circles that 
celebrate a shareholder culture, religiosity, social service, or inflated entitlement 
may be moved by those values enough to try to influence the firm to pursue them 
as well.  Whether he or she will succeed is far from clear.  We desperately need a 
theory about how corporate culture forms and changes (or resists change), and the 
evidence to back it up. 
 
 
76
 See Paul F. Levy, The Nut Island Effect: When Good Teams Go Wrong, Harv. Bus. Rev., March 
2001.  See also Niki A. den Nieuwenboer et al., Middle Managers and Corruptive Routine 
Translation: The Social Production of Deceptive Performance, 28 Org. Sci. 781 (2017). 
77
  See, e.g., Andrew Hoffman, Linking Organizational and Field Level Analyses: The Diffusion of 
Corporate Environmental Practice, 14 Org. & Env. (2001). 
78
 See Gerald Davis & Heinrich Greve, Corporate Elite Networks and Governance Changes in the 
1980s, 103 Am. J. Soc. 1 (1997). 
79
  See John Bizjak et al., Options Backdating and Board Interlocks, 22 Rev. Fin. Stud. 4821 (2009). 
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III. FUNCTIONALISM 
 
 With this background, we can now wade into deeper waters.  The relatively 
more recent contributions by economists to the study of corporate cultures posit 
that cultures exist and persist to the extent that they do useful work in promoting 
competitive marketplace success.
80
  They generate efficiencies.  In developing their 
hypothesis about corporate integrity, for example, GSZ spin out an interesting 
story.  They assume that certain ethical commitments (keeping your word, loyal 
customer service) have long-term financial value but are constantly under short-
term stress.  All other things being equal, turning these strategies into non-
negotiable cultural values inside the firm helps maintain internal coherence and 
resist these stressors.  But when the firm is publicly-held, the stress is harder to 
resist: the stock price fails to reflect the hard-to-value norms, and so executive 
compensation and retention incentives shift greater attention to the shorter-term.
81
  
(This is a familiar argument in the long-term versus short-term debate in corporate 
law).  The disclosure demands associated with public status make it harder to 
enforce internal norms when violated because investors and other external 
stakeholders fear that the disclosed violation may just be the “tip of the iceberg,” 
indicating more problems ahead.  In the absence of such enforcement, the culture 
is more likely to devolve via loss of integrity.  From this they hypothesize that more 
CEO power vis-à-vis shareholders (as proxied by relatively larger compensation 
packages) should correlate positively with integrity, which they find to be the case. 
 While surely insightful, GSZ’s story begs all sorts of questions.  Is the top-
down inculcation of values really how it works?  Is integrity really the long-term 
value maximizing strategy for a firm, or is it instead Oliver Williamson’s famous 
 
80
  Sociologists have generally been viewed as anti-functionalist, but this is not essential.  For an 
assessment of the state of knowledge on corporate cultures in terms of functionalism or not, see 
Chatman & O’Reilly, Paradigm Lost, supra, at 7-8. 
81
  On this dynamic with respect to investments in compliance, see Jeffrey N. Gordon et al., Short-
Changing Compliance (working paper, Sept. 4, 2018); see also note – infra. 
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“opportunism with guile.”?82  Is the market (or are large investors) really unable to 
value corporate reputation on a forward-looking basis?  GSZ assume that the 
market eventually learns of the value, so why wouldn’t that already have occurred 
with enough prior experience?  Their response to all these questions, of course, is 
the empirical evidence: the positive correlation between integrity and subsequent 
performance; the negative correlation between integrity and large share ownership.  
Acknowledging that there is still much more to figure out, they conclude as at least 
a “first cut” that their story holds up.83   
Economists’ approach to corporate culture is mostly theory-driven, albeit 
with some loosening of the strict assumptions underlying neoclassical economic 
theory.
84
  In competitive markets, culture is of importance to the extent that it 
makes firms better able to survive and thrive.  Cultural content will vary from firm-
to-firm, but inferior cultures will gradually be weeded out in favor of more adaptive 
ones.  So what would inferior or adaptive mean?  As noted, the standard answer 
focuses on transaction costs.  Efficient organizational behavior requires the 
coordination of a potentially immense number of agents.  If there is considerable 
disagreement among them as to what is true, or important, or legitimate, 
coordination will bog down in the face of countless negotiations of reality.  By 
hypothesis, then, a valuable corporate culture is one that better puts everyone on 
the same page. 
 That by itself says nothing about the content of those beliefs.  But the same 
theory suggests that particular belief systems will be favored insofar as they more 
effectively motivate or enable competitive activity.  Most economists assume that 
rational perceptual accuracy characterizes successful economic actors, to conform 
as closely as possible to a Bayesian model of learning.  But especially from among 
 
82
 See Oliver Williamson, Calculativeness, Trust and Economic Organization, 36 J. L. & Econ. 453 
(1993). 
83
  GSZ at 75. 
84
  See Kreps, supra; for other work, see, e.g., Eric Van den Steen, On the Origin of Shared Beliefs 
and Corporate Culture, 41 Rand J. Econ. 617 (2010); Benjamin Hermalin, Economics and 
Corporate Culture, in Charles Cooper et al., eds., THE INTERNATIONAL HANDBOOK OF 
ORGANIZATIONAL CULTURE AND CLIMATE (2001); Jesper Sorensen, The Strength of Corporate 
Culture and the Reliability of Firm Performance, 47 Admin. Sci. Q. 70 (2002). 
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behavioral economists, the possibility was raised that there could be adaptive 
heuristics and biases at work in corporate cultures that depart from steely-eyed 
realism in favor in favor of more motivational belief systems.  The most obvious 
possibility is the optimistic, “can do” culture that has an excess (though not to a 
dangerous extreme) belief in the ability of the firm to prosper even against the 
odds.
85
  Such cultures might promote perseverance, risk-taking and long-term 
thinking that are rewarded on average as against more cautious, angst-laden 
competitors, even if the likelihood of occasional bad outcomes is also greater.   
 Some twenty years ago, I made the speculative claim that overconfidence in 
managerial behavior and corporate cultures posed a particularly interesting and 
disturbing legal problem with respect to both liability standards (the application of 
state of mind tests like good faith and scienter) and the deterrence of corporate 
misbehavior.
86
  Since then, I have written about many different manifestations of 
these legal problems.
87
  Other legal scholars now have as well,
88
 with what is now an 
abundance of support from social scientists.  In due course, consideration has been 
given to other distorted beliefs that might be individually and culturally adaptive as 
well.  In general, I have come to believe that competitive incentives favor cultures 
that promote in-group loyalty, aggression toward out-groups, and the rationalization 
of moderately selfish transgressions of norms of good behavior.
89
  Plenty of 
 
85
  See Langevoort, Black Box, supra.  There is a large literature on over-optimism as a stable and 
adaptive bias, though most of it focuses on individual cognition and behavior.  A prominent 
formalization of this is Roland Benabou & Jean Tirole, Self-Confidence and Personal Motivation, 
117 Q.J. Econ. 871 (2002); see also Anand Goel & Anjan Thakor, Overconfidence, CEO Selection 
and Corporate Governance, 63 J. Fin. 2737 (2008).  For an early and influential expression of this 
idea, see J.B. Heaton, Managerial Optimism and Corporate Finance, 31 Fin. Mgt. 33 (2002). 
86
  See Donald C. Langevoort, Organized Illusions: A Behavioral Theory of Why Corporations 
Mislead Investors (and Cause Other Social Harms), 101 U. Pa. L. Rev. 101 (1997).   
87
  E.g., Langevoort, SELLING HOPE, supra, at 26-28, 36-42. 
88
  E.g., DAVID SKEEL, ICARUS IN THE BOARDROOM (2006); Cynthia Williams, Icarus on Steroids, 
94 Geo. L.J. 1197 (2006); Jayne Bernard Narcissism, Over-optimism, Fear, Anger and Depression: 
The Interior Lives of Corporate Leaders, 77 U. Cinn. L. Rev. 405 (2008).   
89
  And that competitive success itself increases these perceptions, at least at the individual level.  See 
Amos Schurr & Ilana Ritov, Winning a Competition Predicts Dishonest Behavior, 113 Proceedings 
Nat’l Acad. Sci. 1754 (2016). 
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literature can now be cited to support these predictions, although most of it 
admittedly relates to individual cognition and behavior, not culture per se.
90
   
Here, I want to stay focused on the pathways question—from what or whom 
do such cultural beliefs derive, and who if anyone has the ability to change the 
prevailing culture away from an excess of profitably self-serving bias?   This is a key 
question for law to ask, given recent emphasis on reforming wayward cultures by 
imposing top down responsibility for preventing failures. One discouraging 
possibility is that cultures are largely resistant to change absent a shock to the 
system, which is unlikely to be administered by choice if the company is not yet in 
crisis.  An aggressive culture perseveres absent strong negative feedback, which can 
be lacking during frothy market conditions and low enforcement intensity.  Leaders 
are usually better off wrapping themselves in the culture than fighting against it. 
This is a dismal-sounding assessment.  So what about GSZ and their more 
optimistic view that the norm of integrity has adaptive value?  My intuition is that it 
depends on marketplace conditions—where commitment to integrity and service 
really does have a long-term payoff and can be signaled credibly, it can emerge and 
persist.
91
  But it is inevitably at risk in the “last period” setting, when key actors come 
to believe, accurately or not, that the firm’s or their own personal time horizons are 
 
90
 The idea of moderation in motivated inference is consistent with the idea that people normally do 
not become so ethically aggressive as to threaten their self-identity as honest and reasonable; the 
danger is the slippery slope and other cognitive enablers that prompt a descent into corruption one 
small step at a time when the right—or better to say, wrong—situational circumstances take hold.  See 
John Darley, The Cognitive and Social Psychology of Contagious Organizational Corruption, 70 
Brook. L. Rev. 1177 (2005).  For supportive evidence from neuroscience, see Neil Garrett et al., 
The Brain Adapts to Dishonesty, 19 Nature Neuroscience 1727 (2016).  In a recent article, I 
described the main task of anyone in the firm (e.g., a chief ethics and compliance offer) who wants 
to counter the temptations of a self-serving culture as having to counter the most pernicious scripts 
that key corporate agents use to justify themselves and the behavior of others.  See Langevoort, 
Cultures of Compliance, supra.  Tom Tyler’s work, in particular, emphasizes that decisions to obey 
the law require either a strong threat of enforcement or a buy-in to the legitimacy of what is asked.  
E.g., Tom Tyler, Reducing Corporate Criminality: The Role of Values, 51 Am Crim. L. Rev. 257 
(2014).  If, as is often the case, the threat itself is muted by inadequate enforcement resources or 
political willpower, then legitimacy dominates.  Countering this in the name of good compliance is 
not easy, especially when the antipathy is deep. Indeed, there is enough dysfunction in lawmaking, 
regulation and enforcement to sustain the myths as against arguments otherwise.  A company that 
comes to believe that its business model will accomplish wonders but is being held back by archaic 
regulatory norms has little difficulty in fostering an aggressive attitude toward opportunism.  
91
 See Thomas M. Jones et al., How Applying Instrumental Stakeholder Theory Can Provide 
Sustainable Competitive Advantage, 43 Acad. Mgt. Rev. 371 (2018). 
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tightening because of intense competition or disruption of their markets, so that the 
short game comes to be seen as the only game.
92
  Arguably, some firms (and 
industries) are so fast-paced that they take on permanent last period status in terms 
of the kinds of beliefs and behaviors that are validated and rewarded.
93
  Perhaps 
GSZ are getting their results about the payoffs from integrity from the less visibly 
stressed sector of the economy, particularly given that their integrity metric was 
drawn from the “best places to work” survey tool.94  Or, perhaps a bit more 
disturbingly, that reputations are sticky, so that both the internal and external 
perceptions of the commitment to integrity can persist longer than is justifiable, 
creating a profitable opportunity in the relative near-term to cash in on the built-up 
reputational capital.
95
  Enron, after all, was a best place to work—number 22 on 
Fortune’s ranking in the year 200096—until it suddenly became bankrupt and treated 
as a criminal enterprise a year later.   
Whatever is going on in the first step in the GSZ analysis, their second 
inference—that increased shareholder presence or power leads to an erosion in 
integrity—makes sense under the adaptive culture hypothesis.  It seems amply 
plausible that external shareholder pressure increases internal stress that challenges 
the efficacy of the internal “grease” of shared beliefs.  High information asymmetry 
coupled with potentially adverse consequences from bad news or even not-so-bad 
news that cannot be processed with precision (the tip of the iceberg problem to 
which GSZ allude) incentivizes disclosure gamesmanship.  Here we can also 
borrow from psychology.  Well-known work by Lerner and Tetlock suggests that 
accountability can have beneficial effects ex ante in resolving agency cost problems, 
it backfires as applied ex post, leading to defensiveness rather than integrity.
97
  
 
92
 See Jennifer Arlen & William Carney, Vicarious Liability for Fraud on Securities Markets: Theory 
and Evidence, 1992 U. Ill. L. Rev. 691. 
93
  See HO, supra.   
94
  GSZ hypothesize that integrity is discovered slowly by the capital markets, citing work that also 
uses the best places to work data.  See Alex Edmans, Does the Stock Market Fully Value 
Intangibles? Employee Satisfaction and Equity Prices, 101 J. Fin. Econ. 621 (2011). 
95
  See generally JONATHAN MACEY, THE DEATH OF CORPORATE REPUTATION (2013).   
96
 See Enron ranked a best place to work, Dec. 19, 2000, available at 
https://www.bizjournals.com/houston/stories/2000/12/18/daily12.html.   
97
  See Jennifer Lerner & Philip Tetlock, Accounting for the Effects of Accountability, 125 Psych. 
Bull. 255 (1999). 
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Where that becomes the inclination, it would be difficult to maintain a healthy 
culture.  Again, this is situational.  Firms that are for the moment generating mainly 
good news can celebrate honestly.  But when the internal news turns sour and 
potentially blameworthy, the temptations to denial and defensiveness strengthen.  
The gamesmanship (or worse) is thereby legitimized.   
All this leads me to a brief observation about “short-termism” in the 
corporate governance debates.
98
  For reasons discussed earlier, I am reasonably well 
persuaded that integrity is undervalued in the capital markets not because it is 
unimportant but hard to commit to credibly given the dynamics just described.  
Some firms overcome the challenge and gain stable and reliable reputations, but 
not most.  Credibility, then, is a key variable, which when doubted by the 
marketplace leads to managerial (and cultural) frustration and greater inwardness.
99
 
As GSZ infer, one foreseeable managerial response is to take steps to manage 
impressions better—salient short-term actions that will have a pay-off.  Cost-cutting is 
a possibility, which can produce the pressures and rationalizations that cause a drop 
in ethics and heightened compliance risks.  That much I concede, consistent with 
the empirical observations.  Going public generates ethical stress.  But it is mainly 
when managerial credibility is already in doubt, which makes it unfair and 
misleading to attribute any cultural devolution to investor greed or amoral myopia, 
much less legal norms about serving shareholders.   In the end, managers of such 
firms are as complicit as anyone for setting in motion the kind of internal culture 
where self-serving visions of success and survival come to dominate.  If so, more 
managerialism would not be a good antidote.  So we are getting closer to my main 
point in this essay. 
   
 
 
98
  More broadly, see Roe, supra. 
99
  In a recent article, I develop an approach to antifraud liability for “soft” statements heavily based 
by the centrality of perceived credibility and the opportunities for gamesmanship otherwise created.  
See Donald C. Langevoort, Disasters and Disclosures: Securities Fraud Liability in the Shadow of a 
Corporate Catastrophe, 107 Geo. L.J. 967 (2019). 
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IV. CULTURE AND THE PRIMACY DEBATES 
   
The political push in favor of greater managerialism implies that 
diminishing the influence of investors would bring about a return to benevolence 
and a greater focus on the collective long-term.  Integrity and stewardship values 
can be restored to cultural prominence.  The detritus of shareholder wealth 
obsession flows out of the system, replaced by cleaner water.  So the managerialists’ 
campaign slogan promises.   
They may be right, of course—there are foreseeable political and economic 
conditions where that could happen.  But if my hypothesis is right that cultures 
emerge and change organically as survival mechanisms to adapt to perceived 
conditions,
100
 this is hardly assured.  Shareholder and stock market pressures are 
hardly the only threats to managers that limit autonomy and control; globalization 
and relentless innovation by competitors and potential competitors demand focus, 
intensity, and immense discipline as cultural values.   
Nor is it obvious that shareholder primacy has ever become a dominant 
value inside the corporation.  Notwithstanding anecdotal evidence like Enron’s 
positioning of a stock ticker display in its headquarters lobby, I am skeptical that 
corporate managers (or most corporate lawyers
101
) ever embraced that norm so 
much as paying it lip service from within the familiar protections of the business 
judgment rule.  My hypothesis is that corporate managers have deep-seated 
suspicion of shareholders, considering them insufficiently knowledgeable about 
long-term firm value and/or biased by conflicts of interest.  In other words, 
 
100
 See Langevoort, Black Box, supra, at 92-93 (“My account indeed suggests that corporate cultures 
can produce behaviors that are largely self-serving responses to their particular economic 
environment, and in the face of strong competition, make very few trade-offs in pursuit of survival 
and success”).  Along these same lines with specific reference to principal-agency theory, see J.B. 
Heaton, The “Long Term” in Corporate Law, 72 Bus. Lawyer 353-56 (2017)(the battling over 
corporate law “masks the real battle, one between a rational desire by clear-sighted shareholders for 
shareholder value maximization, on the one hand, and a desire by the courts and others for 
corporate longevity—i.e., long-term corporate survival—on the other”).  Heaton points to the role of 
cognitive biases in the effort to understand this battle.  Id. at 366; Heaton, supra. 
101
   E.g., Marty Lipton, who effectively expresses a version of unabashed managerialism in ways that 
executives would like to express but feel somewhat silenced in today’s environment.   
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managers understand the power investors have, especially over market prices, but 
resent it as an unwarranted imposition.  Non-controlling shareholders are perceived 
as out-groups, therefore, not in-groups. The just desserts from success are divided 
up among managers and stakeholders pursuant to a bias on the part of directors 
that sees the managers as main creators of the value,
102
 lesser stakeholders (including 
shareholders) as mere suppliers of resources who need to be paid.  The stock and 
options in which managers are paid naturally makes them want high stock prices—
they are by no means indifferent to that which also produces shareholder wealth.  
But the myth and the resulting motivation ascribe something more sacred to 
marketplace success, even if objective outsiders might see in this something akin to 
what psychologists refer to the fundamental attribution bias (i.e., taking excess credit 
for success, while externalizing blame for failure).
103
  This frustration has led to the 
campaign we identified earlier, pushing back hard to recreate the world of 
managerial autonomy as against the supposed short-termism of shareholder 
influence.  But as we noted earlier and soon will come back to, there is another way 
of reading that story.
104
 
This suggests that the historical image of twentieth century managerialism as 
a golden era may well be a self-serving myth.  Brian Cheffins points out in recent 
work that there is evidence of little scandal and high willingness to contribute to 
labor peace and maintaining the social infrastructure.
105
   But he observes that this 
was a product of a unique time in American history, with a surplus of rents to 
 
102
  I made the argument around the time of the scandals that it was no coincidence that most all 
those firms were in markets characterized by rapid technological change and thus backwards-looking 
regulatory structures that could easily be rationalized away as dangerously anachronistic in a greased-
up culture, leading to a slippery slope of accelerating malfeasance. Donald C. Langevoort, 
Technological Evolution and the Devolution of Corporate Financial Reporting, 46 Wm. & Mary L. 
Rev. 1 (2004). 
103
  See Guoli Chen et al., Making the Same Mistake All Over Again: CEO Overconfidence and 
Corporate Resistance to Corrective Feedback, 36 Strategic Mgt. J. 1513 (2015). 
104
 One of the fundamental assumptions in sociology and anthropology is that beliefs matter greatly in 
determining social norms (and vice versa), quite apart from whether they are true.  See Donald C. 
Langevoort, Taking Myths Seriously: An Essay for Lawyers, 74 Chi. Kent L. Rev. 1569 (2000).  
Field theory posits that powerful actors will try to co-opt ideas to legitimate rent-seeking behavior.  
See Fligstein, supra. On the battle of ideas from the standpoint of economics, see Dani Rodrik, 
When Ideas Trump Interests: Preferences, Worldviews and Policy Innovations, 28 J. Econ. 
Perspectives 189 (2014). 
105
  This account is developed in full in BRIAN R. CHEFFINS, THE PUBLIC COMPANY TRANSFORMED 
(2019).   
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collect and spend, not likely to be repeated going forward.  I doubt that that time 
was ever as pro-social as portrayed,
106
 but agree with his assessment of its historical 
contingency to whatever degree it was accurate.  Unless coupled with a step up in 
what government or the public insist on from large firms, the golden era image 
works mainly as a rallying cry for taking back control along with the rents.   
And the latter brings us back to publicness.  The hoped-for consequence of 
the dismissal of shareholder primacy, to many, is to create a vacuum that would be 
filled with pro-social norms.  And with enough external pressure and the right 
political conditions, it could.  But I doubt that such pressure would be any more 
welcome inside the corporate culture than shareholder demands.  At first glance, 
this should pose no comparable threat to internal culture.  Disclosure and 
accountability are soft and benign sounding demands that would not be likely to 
generate much internal dissonance, especially when the cultural boundaries of the 
firm are relatively porous in the way Greg Urban described earlier.  There is ample 
evidence that successful engagement with stakeholders in response to the 
expectations of publicness pay off for perceptive firms.
 107
     
But at many firms, I suspect, the demands of publicness are also coded as 
threats, especially when the internal culture feels under attack from outside.  The 
demands can seem harsh and unforgiving,
108
 and thus interpreted as unfair and 
undeserved in order to maintain cognitive consistency and self-respect.  So, they 
trigger denial and reactance.  Honesty is a hard norm to maintain when outside 
groups demand transparency, accountability and voice and those inside (via self-
deception or not) come to believe that the truth will be distorted or misunderstood 
in applying those demands.  In particular, elite managers and other incumbents will 
 
106
 The mechanisms that lead to the public exposure of illicit corporate behavior have become far 
more sophisticated and intensely driven than they were back then; indeed, some of these 
mechanisms are the product, directly or indirectly, of changes in public capital markets.  E.g., 
Alexander I. Dyck et al., Who Blows the Whistle on Corporate Fraud?, 65 J. Fin. 2213 (2010).  
And the commitment to pro-sociality was to a distinctly conservative vision of the public good, 
spreading its benefits very unevenly.   
107
  See Witold J. Henisz et al., Spinning Gold: The Financial Returns to Stakeholder Engagement, 
35 Strategic Mgt. J. 1727 (2014)(positive financial valuation effects of greater stakeholder 
engagement); Karl V. Lins et al., Social Capital, Trust and Firm Performance: The Value of 
Corporate Social Responsibility during the Financial Crisis, 72 J. Fin. 1785 (2017). 
108
 See note -- supra. 
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see publicness as a threat to the efficiency of the internal corporate culture as an 
extension of their attitudes, beliefs and preferences.  So my hypothesis would be 
that many of the concerns about external demands undermining the coherence and 
efficiency of the internal culture are present with respect to publicness as well. 
  Again, this depends on how forceful publicness is.  I lean in favor of it as 
valuable to corporate law and governance, but have to concede that there are open 
questions.   A largely unexplored aspect of publicness has to do with the efficacy of 
the demands—do they actually pay off in a meaningful way for stakeholders and 
society, if not in dividends or capital appreciation?  Publicness is hard to measure 
empirically, though as just noted, some work tries. Maybe measures of social 
responsibility and sustainability are workable proxies for publicness.  However, the 
state of the art on assessing its embrace and sustainable commitment (and who it 
benefits) is still early-stage.  For all the skirmishing in the aftermath of multiple 
scandals in the last two decades, transparency remains limited, accountability often 
fails dramatically, and outsider voices are amplified but still may not matter.  We 
may have what Marcel Kahan and Ed Rock have described as a world of corporate 
governance that uses symbolic public palliatives to normalize concentrated 
corporate control with weak effects in terms of outcomes.
109
 They can be more 
about identity politics than real stakeholder influence.
110
  If so, the internal 
corporate invective that the demands of publicness badly fail a cost-benefit test can’t 
be dismissed as mere defensiveness, even though I suspect it often is.  Myths thrive 
by ingesting grains of truth.  The pushback against publicness may overwhelm it, so 
that all that would fill the vacuum in the demise of shareholder empowerment is 
autonomy in the gathering and distribution of rents. 
 
 
 
 
109
  See Kahan & Rock, supra. 
110
  See Claire Hill, supra. 
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V.  PRIVATENESS 
 
 The cultural effects of external pressures from public shareholders and 
stakeholders can usefully be assessed by imagining conditions in firms where those 
pressures are weakest.   Publicness operates along a continuum—firms vary in their 
susceptibility to the amalgam of legal and extra-legal pressures.  SEC registrants get 
a big dose of it for that reason alone.  But a large closely-held corporation will be 
subject to regulatory demands (including the antifraud parts of the securities laws), 
and many of the legitimacy demands that come from consumers, politicians, the 
media and other stakeholders.  Size matters, but even more does the heft of the 
company’s footprint on society.  It’s all a matter of degree, a recursive loop of law 
and public salience. 
Almost by definition, then, there will also be certain corporations that face 
less pressure, inhabiting a dimly lit social and economic setting closer to 
“privateness” than publicness.  Corporations gain a greater degree of privateness by 
avoiding public share ownership, though as just noted, autonomy may be limited by 
other factors: size, field-specific regulatory intensity, or visibility in public-facing 
product or labor markets.  So the natural question relating to culture is to ask what 
we might predict as we move toward greater privateness.  Empirical work is less 
helpful here because private firms generate less data for the variables that might 
affect culture.
111
   
 Consistent with our earlier conjectures about how publicness decreases 
internal culture coherence by challenging the beliefs and power negotiations (self-
serving or otherwise) that grease the internal corporate machinery, a plausible 
assumption would be that privateness at the very least enables a stronger, more 
coherent internal culture.  Private firms face far less pressure to speak publicly 
 
111
  Private companies are also very diverse and under-theorized, so that so that drawing from some 
overarching governance paradigm is foolish.  See Elizabeth Pollman, Startup Governance, U. Pa. L. 
Rev. (forthcoming, 2019).  Tech start-ups differ considerably in terms of likely cultural influences 
from family owned companies that have been around for decades; the latter more likely reflect the 
mythology of family itself, expanded to include employees as family.   
Draft: August 26, 2019 
 
36 
 
about sensitive matters, avoiding the tip of the iceberg problem that GSZ identify.  
Messages in a relatively closed system are less likely to become mixed or garbled, 
more likely to stay on script.  Governance need not be negotiated as much. 
 This prediction, then, aligns with GSZ—on average, cultures in the private 
ownership space have more stability under stress, producing long-term value when 
the underlying values are about integrity and care for stakeholders.  But I suspect 
that there is considerable volatility, and considerable risk associated with too much 
privateness.  Private firms are also likely to be places where the prevailing power 
structure can perpetuate a culture that reflects the beliefs, ego and desires of those 
in charge, which will not always be so benign or other-regarding.   The Nut Island 
effect, mentioned earlier, shows what can happen when a subculture becomes 
obsessed with privilege and privacy. 
112
  And successful startups surely have their 
own narratives about risk-taking (and rule-bending) that resist the discipline of 
internal controls and full disclosure.
113
  I would suggest something of a U-shaped 
curve, with cultures doing their best when checks and balances are working.   
These conjectures require rigorous testing, of course, which again is not 
particularly easy.  Data is harder to come by for private firms, and when privacy and 
freedom are prized, those in power are unlikely to open up candidly to 
enthnographers or survey-takers.  Anecdotally, the story told about private 
companies that have taken on an out-sized (but not publicly visible) role in 
conservative politics is unsettling.  An apparently large number of the leaders in the 
corporate liberty (anti-regulation) movement—for which the Koch brothers have 
become the most well-known—had run-ins with environmental, consumer 
protection or securities regulators earlier in their firms’ histories.114  The anger 
turned into denial and rationalization.  Cultural scripts that de-legitimate regulators 
by stressing the oppositional ideology behind law-making (e.g., EPA staff as radical 
 
112
  See note --- supra; see also van Rooij & Fine, supra.  
113
  See Pollman, supra.   
114
  Stories of the radical right’s multi-billion dollar commitment to supporting “scientific” attacks on 
regulation (and the disingenuous building of political alliances with gun owners or abortion 
opponents for mutual support to gain leverage in the attacks on regulation) stress how many of the 
biggest donors to this cause passed through a crucible of litigation where they or their companies 
were targeted by regulators.  See JANE MAYER, DARK MONEY 15-25 (2016). 
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environmentalists) or its mindlessness (lazy bureaucrats who have never had to sell 
a product or meet a payroll) substantially reduces the felt need to obey the law for 
reasons short of fear of sanctions.
115
  In turn, such a cultural trope enables more 
aggressive political spending to disable or impoverish the regulators even more.  
Here, in a reversal of the common assumption about how the general culture 
influences corporate culture, the rationalizations from inside the corporate world 
come to affect (or infect) the political and social culture.  As our society becomes 
more and more polarized, with far too many people convinced that Washington is 
the official year-round home of the devil and his helpers from the domain of 
publicness, I strongly suspect that there will be even more corporate cultures were 
the illegitimacy myth becomes infectious.
116
 
All this brings more resonance to the legal debate, for example, of whether 
to require public companies to disclose their political activities and spending 
practices.
117
  Proponents (like me) think that such disclosure would be valuable to 
shed sunlight on the possibility that senior managers use corporate funds to foster 
their personal political preferences, which they simply rationalize as corporate best 
interests; opponents push back with claims that market pressures and good 
governance practices suffice to assure that management keeps its eye on wealth 
maximization alone, and disclosure will compromise savvy political strategies.  
Surely there is a cultural angle to this that deserves to be explored as to both public 
and private firms. 
 
 
 
115
  This kind of motivated cynicism is a significant challenge to organizational compliance with law, 
as I have stressed in other work.  Langevoort, Cultures of Compliance, supra; see also SOLTES, 
supra, at 157-58 (rationalization of white collar crime via denigration of law-makers and law-
enforcers); Todd Haugh, The Criminalization of Compliance, 92 Notre Dame L. Rev. 1215 
(2017)(reactance to heavy-handed enforcement and compliance tactics). 
116
  A similar observation might be made about religiosity—corporate power structures supported by 
an internal culture that self-identifies as strongly religious (e.g., Hobby Lobby) operates mostly in 
partial darkness but projects outward politically as well. On the need for enthnography in exploring 
this unique sort of corporate culture, see Gordon, supra. 
117
  See Lucian Bebchuk et al., The Untenable Case for Keeping Investors in the Dark, 10 Harv. 
Bus. L. Rev. (forthcoming, 2019); Michael Guttentag, On Requiring Public Companies to Disclose 
Political Spending, 2014 Colum. Bus. L. Rev. 593. 
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VI. CONCLUSION 
 
We have now circled back to the governance wars introduced earlier in this 
essay.  This has become bitterly contested territory to committed managerialists.   
While most of their campaign arguments are purely instrumental—what is best for 
society and/or investors—some of the rhetoric and tactics are increasingly 
libertarian, in search of a wider swath of autonomy and corporate privacy almost as 
a natural right.  The First Amendment has emerged as a newly potent litigation tool, 
enabling this campaign in terms of brute political spending
118
 and perhaps—
depending on how the law of corporate freedom of speech turns over the next few 
years—creating more space for a constitutional freedom not to speak so as to check 
the regulatory state’s love affair with disclosure requirements.119  
We should not even try to predict the outcome of any of these forthcoming 
battles, much less the so-called war.  There are visible and growing political 
fractures on all sides.  Both shareholder rights and stakeholder rights are loosely 
perceived as progressive causes, as we have seen, but many left-leaning participants 
have a strong aversion to the power and privilege associated with massive holdings 
of investor wealth, especially when directly at the production of even more 
shareholder wealth.
120
 The right has in the recent past been a reliable ally for 
managerial power, but as Steve Bainbridge writes,
121
 there is stress here as well, as 
right-leaning economic populism redraws the terms of corporate social 
responsibility in its own nativist image.  Other influential actors in the business 
 
118
  On the connection between corporate political expenditures enabled by cases like Citizens 
United and publicness pressures, see Sarah Haan, The CEO and the Hydraulics of Campaign 
Finance Deregulation, 109 Nw. U. L. Rev. 269 (2015). 
119
  See Nat’l Ass’n Manufacturers v. SEC, 800 F.3d 518 (D.C. Cir. 2015)(invalidating a portion of 
the SEC’s “conflict mineral” disclosure rules on First Amendment grounds).  On the libertarian 
potential in the compelled speech jurisprudence, see Sarah Haan, The Post-Truth First 
Amendment, 94 Ind. L.J. --- (forthcoming 2018). 
120
 See Bruner, supra. 
121
 See Stephen M. Bainbridge, Corporate Purpose in a Populist Era, available at 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3237107 (2018). 
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community seem anxious to make peace on both fronts, fearful of the angry 
direction in which public discourse is turning.
122
   
 For a few years now, evidence has mounted that the public corporation as 
we knew it for most of the twentieth century is in decline, at least numerically if not 
in gross size.
123
  Many corporate governance and corporate law scholars have 
weighed in on whether, why and if whatever is happening here is good or bad.  A 
large part of the response is once again political, generating endless deregulatory 
initiatives in the name of global competitiveness, innovation and job creation to 
bring the public company back to health.  Facilitating a world of private capital that 
deserves less, if any, regulatory support and intervention beyond protecting 
property and contract rights is a move that thrills conservatives in business and 
politics, part of a many-faceted assault on the regulatory state and its enabler, 
publicness.   
 The social science we have reviewed ostensibly bolsters the deregulators’ 
case by offering evidence that strong shareholder rights (or a strong norm of 
shareholder primacy) are a threat to good corporate culture.  I get the point that all 
other things being equal, highly focused cultures are easier to maintain and generate 
more value in the absence of heavy shareholder and stock market pressures, for the 
reasons given above.  But all other things are rarely equal, and cultures can devolve 
for many different reasons.  Then, something or someone has to disrupt that 
cultural devolution, and shareholders may be best positioned to operate as a check 
on culture run amok. 
 The supposed value of publicness, on the other hand, is not at all about 
efficiency or profitability.  Indeed, this is where most sociologists and many 
progressive legal scholars end up.  Shareholder primacy undermines the public 
good and should be curbed, whereas greater transparency, accountability and voice 
are good for us all.   On the other hand, fervent managerialists want neither and 
 
122
  See the Business Roundtable “switch,” supra note ---. 
123
 See Langevoort, SELLING HOPE, supra, at 111-112, 165-66.  For doubts about this hypothesis, see 
CHEFFINS, supra, ch. 7; see also Brian R. Cheffins, The Rise (and Fall?) of the Berle-Means 
Corporation, 42 Seattle U. L. Rev. (2018). 
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thus are inclined to lump them together to challenge their legitimacy. That creates a 
political dilemma for progressives.  Precisely because publicness is so inchoate, 
there is (currently) no powerful, organized force to lobby on its behalf.  By and 
large, it has to rely on allies, the most effective of which come from the progressive 
side of the institutional investor community, or wait for scandals large enough to 
create a brief moment of political opportunity to seek something stronger.  
Conversely, the shareholder rights community needs political help, too, and sees 
the publicness values as a supportive ideology.  Thus, publicness and the 
shareholder rights stay coupled to a greater extent than they need be conceptually.   
In turn, effective political attacks on one are felt by the other.  If that continues, 
we’ll see what the consequences are.  Publicness remains an important 
phenomenon descriptively, which is why it is so contested politically and why so 
much effort is going into giving firms flexibility in financing, liquidity and 
governance without triggering public status.  Normatively, it’s hard to measure its 
impact on corporate behavior.  
My aim here has not been to answer the normative questions of what good, 
if any, publicness does, or whether the turn to privateness is anything more than 
rent-seeking.  I hope to have said something interesting about corporate culture: the 
many ways it is studied, the comparisons and contrasts in theories about what it is 
and how it works, and the ways it is influenced by and in turn influences more 
general social beliefs about economic power and privilege. Corporate publicness 
and privateness are competing to write the dominant narrative about the legitimate 
exercise of economic power in society, seeking all the legitimacy support their 
champions can muster.  Whatever direction all this takes, it is worth thinking 
harder than we have about how corporate cultures fit into the story, especially if 
culture is as potent as so many believe.   
